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I.    OVERVIEW 
On December 1, 2017, Texas House Bill 214 (H.B. 214) took effect, and 
as a result, women in Texas will soon be forced to purchase an additional 
insurance policy to cover an “elective abortion,” even in cases of rape or 
incest.1  Due to its lack of exceptions,2 the bill is colloquially known as the 
Texas “rape insurance bill.”3  Under the new restrictions, an insurance 
policy offered under a health benefit exchange plan in Texas cannot provide 
coverage for an elective abortion unless: 
 
1. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 5 (“[Texas 
women] could choose to carry a supplemental insurance plan for elective abortion coverage, if needed, 
or they could choose a private insurance plan that provided that coverage separately from the issuer’s 
other health coverage.”); see also Royce Poinsett, A Recap of the 85th Texas Legislature’s Special Session, 
80 TEX. B.J. 594, 594 (2017) (“HB 214 makes Texas one of eight states to bar private insurance 
companies from including abortion procedures in base coverage; Texas women will have to buy 
supplemental policies to cover abortions performed outside of medical emergencies.”). 
 2. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 5 (“The bill 
would not include an exception for insurance to cover abortion in the case of rape or incest.”). 
3. See Gaby Galvin, New Texas Law Bans Health Insurers from Covering Abortion in General Plans, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.  (Aug. 15, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-
news/articles/2017-08-15/texas-gov-greg-abbott-signs-abortion-coverage-ban-into-law [https:// 
perma.cc/FJX8-U9LC] (“The new law would require consumers to purchase supplemental coverage, 
which opponents liken to ‘rape insurance.’”); see also Shannon Najmabadi, Abbott Signs Bill Restricting 
Insurance Coverage of Abortion, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2017/08/15/abbott-signs-bill-restricting-insurance-coverage-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/AG8Q-
B4JN] (“Detractors [of H.B. 214] . . . dubbed the separate insurance now needed to cover non-
emergency abortions ‘rape insurance.’”); Alexandra Sifferlin, Texas Passes Law Significantly Limiting 
Coverage for Abortion Procedures, TIME (Aug. 16, 2017, 10:05 AM), http://time.com/4901883/texas-
abortion-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/XML2-DHUP] (“Critics have dubbed the law, ‘rape insurance,’ 
since women will have to anticipate their need for an abortion ahead of time.”). 
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(1) the coverage is provided to an enrollee separately from other health benefit plan 
coverage offered by the health benefit plan issuer; (2) the enrollee pays the 
premium for coverage for elective abortion separately from, and in addition to, the 
premium for other health benefit plan coverage, if any; and (3) the enrollee 
provides a signature for coverage for elective abortion, separately and distinct from the 
signature required for other health benefit plan coverage, if any, provided to 
the enrollee by the health benefit plan issuer.4  
Proponents of the bill herald its passage as a win for the economic and 
religious freedoms of Texans who object to abortion.5  These proponents 
argue more needs to be done to ensure federal funds are not allocated to 
subsidize abortion services covered by health benefit exchange plans 
through premiums garnered from the public.6  Proponents also claim that, 
prior to H.B. 214’s passage, freedom of choice in insurance coverage was 
limited for those who oppose abortion, and many were “forced” to buy 
plans which covered the procedure, even if they would never be interested 
in obtaining an abortion.7 
However, opponents of the bill counter that H.B. 214 “could create a 
situation in which a woman might not have insurance coverage if she and 
her doctor determined it was necessary to terminate a wanted, planned 
pregnancy.”8  For example, in instances where a pregnant woman is 
diagnosed with a fatal disease and given a prognosis of only a few years, or 
a serious fetal abnormality develops during pregnancy “that [does] not 
clearly meet the definition of a ‘medical emergency’ under state law,” the 
woman would not have insurance coverage for an elective abortion unless 
she anticipated needing such coverage beforehand and contracted for it 
 
4. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1218.004 (emphasis added). 
5. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 5 (“Many 
Texans do not want to pay for abortion coverage as part of their basic health insurance plan for moral 
or other reasons.”); see also Galvin, supra note 3 (“[H.B. 214] will ensure the economic freedom of 
Texans who oppose the procedure.”). 
6. See Galvin, supra note 3 (“Rep. John Smithee, the lead author of the abortion coverage bill, 
said abortion opponents should not have to subsidize ‘elective’ abortions through their insurance 
plans . . . .  ‘This isn’t about who can get an abortion,’ Smithee said.  ‘It is about who is forced to pay 
for an abortion.’”). 
7. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 5 (“[H.B. 214] 
would enhance transparency and help ensure that Texans were not paying for health insurance 
coverage that they did not want or need.”); see also Press Release, Office of the Tex. Governor, 
Governor Abbott Signs Pro-Life Insurance Reform (Aug. 15, 2017), https://gov.texas.gov/news/ 
post/governor-abbott-signs-pro-life-insurance-reform [http://perma.cc/PPU7-BBY9] (“[H.B. 214] 
prohibits insurance providers from forcing Texas policy holders to subsidize elective abortions.”). 
8. H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 5. 
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separately.9  In this situation, the mother may never have thought she would 
need an abortion and did not think to procure separate coverage.10  Even 
worse, now that H.B. 214 is in full effect, a woman may even retroactively 
lose coverage provided under her previous insurance plan unless she 
contracts for supplemental abortion coverage and pays additional 
premiums.11  This means a woman, who would have had coverage for an 
abortion under her insurance policy prior to the implementation of 
H.B. 214, could have no other option but to pay the entire cost of a surgical 
abortion shortly after being placed in a dire situation.12 
While freedom of choice and a right to conscience are undeniably worthy 
of acknowledgment and protection, the blanket regulation within H.B. 214 
obstructs a woman’s constitutional right to choose whether to terminate her 
pregnancy.  First, although the bill’s drafters claim the provisions are 
“necessary to prevent those with moral, religious and philosophical 
objections from having to pay for the procedure,”13 the bill fails to 
accommodate the inevitable cost increase of obtaining insurance coverage 
for abortion and the slippery slope created by allowing citizens to opt out 
of generally applicable and nonrestrictive laws based on individual religious 
beliefs.14  Further, by failing to make exceptions for abortions procured in 
cases of rape or incest, exceptions recognized under the Hyde 
Amendment,15 the provisions of H.B. 214 impose an additional, unjustified 
 
9. Id.  See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.002(3) (defining “‘medical 
emergency’ [as] a life-threatening physical condition aggravated by, caused by, or arising from a 
pregnancy that, as certified by a physician, places the woman in danger of death or a serious risk of 
substantial impairment of a major bodily function unless an abortion is performed”). 
10. H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 5. 
11. See id. at 4 (“[H.B. 214] would take effect December 1, 2017, and would apply to a qualified 
health plan offered through a health benefit exchange or a health benefit plan issued on or after 
April 1, 2018.”). 
12. See Galvin, supra note 3 (“[H.B. 214] will impact people who have coverage and will now be 
denied services . . . .  So regardless of how big that number is, people who have health coverage should 
be able to get the services they need.”); see also Eugene Gu, Texas ‘Rape Insurance’ Bill is About Economic 
Violence Against Women, THE HILL (Aug. 17, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ 
pundits-blog/healthcare/347004-texas-rape-insurance-bill-about-economic-violence-against-women 
[https://perma.cc/7WZ6-7WDF] (“A surgical abortion can cost up to $1[,]500 in the first trimester to 
around $10,000 in the second trimester.”). 
13. Najmabadi, supra note 3. 
14. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 6 (reporting 
opponents of H.B. 214 argue “[t]he bill would open the door to possible exclusions on other basic 
health insurance coverage”). 
15. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 13, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-78, §§ 509–510, 111 Stat. 1467, 1516 
(prohibiting any of “the funds appropriated under this Act” from being “expended for any abortion” 
4
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restriction on a woman’s access to abortion.  Although these restrictions are 
purported to fulfill a state interest in the conscience use of taxpayer funds,16 
this interest was already being sufficiently met by the protective provisions 
in the Hyde Amendment and related legislation.17  Finally, H.B. 214 fails 
the Supreme Court’s three-prong undue burden standard, established in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey18 (hereinafter Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey) and its progeny. 
This paper will critically examine H.B. 214 and argue that the bill is 
subject to a constitutional challenge under the Supreme Court’s undue 
burden standard for the following reasons: (1) H.B. 214’s purpose, although 
proclaimed to be an interest in economic and religious freedom from 
subsidizing abortion, appears in context to be motivated mainly by a political 
agenda to restrict a woman’s access to abortion in Texas; (2) the effect of 
H.B. 214 is to increase the cost of previously easily attainable and affordable 
coverage for abortion, thereby serving as an additional deterrent to an 
already stigmatized and highly traumatic procedure; and (3) even taking the 
stated purposes at face value, these purposes fail to pass the threshold of 
veracity—whereby a reviewing court is justified in examining the context of 
the proclaimed purpose—because there are less restrictive measures in place 
that adequately protect the purported interests. 
 
or “health benefits coverage that includes coverage of abortion[,]” except “if the pregnancy is the result 
of an act of rape or incest[,]” or the woman suffers from “a life-endangering physical condition caused 
by or arising from the pregnancy itself, that would, as a certified physician, place the woman in danger 
of death unless an abortion is performed”).  “One of the quirks of the Hyde amendment is that it is a 
‘rider’ to an annual appropriations bill, which means it is not permanent law, but must be renewed  
by Congress each year.”  Julie Rovner, Abortion Funding Ban Has Evolved Over the Years, NPR  
(Dec. 14, 2009, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121402281 
[https://perma.cc/SL9D-J7JR]. 
16. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7 (describing the purported purpose of H.B. 214). 
17. See supra note 15 (discussing the nature and substance of the Hyde Amendment). 
18. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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II.    THE ABORTION DEBATE IN THE CONTEXT OF INSURANCE COVERAGE 
A. The Growing Trend of Regulating Abortion Coverage in State Insurance Markets 
The topic of abortion is contentious and often polarizing,19 even in 
discussions regarding insurance coverage.20  In this debate, Texas has 
traditionally taken a hard-line pro-life stance regarding abortion, which 
serves as air in the sails of H.B. 214.21 
Upon signing H.B. 214, Governor Greg Abbott quickly released a 
statement heralding the bill as “an important piece of the Governor’s pro-
life agenda,” and declaring that he was “proud to sign legislation that ensures 
no Texan is ever required to pay for a procedure that ends the life of an 
unborn child.”22  Texas State Representative John Smithee (R-Amarillo), 
lead author of H.B. 214, expressed similar sentiments, emphasizing the bill 
was “necessary to prevent those with moral, religious[,] and philosophical 
objections from having to pay for the procedure.”23 
However, in the midst of Governor Abbott’s celebration, the bill’s 
passage garnered an opposite response from Democrats and the media 
alike.24  Texas State Representative Chris Turner (D-Grand Prairie), among 
the first to speak out against H.B. 214 during its consideration, discussed 
the unfortunate situation some women may find themselves in now that the 
bill is law: “Women don’t plan to be raped.  Parents don’t plan for their 
children to be victims of incest . . . .  Asking a woman or a parent to foresee 
 
19. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HISTORY 421 (2d ed. 
2016) (“As a political matter, positions hardened by about 1980, when Republicans adopted a pro-life 
position and Democrats adopted a pro-choice position in their national platforms. . . .  [T]he hardening 
of national positions made the issue of abortion contentious in the nomination and confirmation of 
federal judges . . . .”). 
20. See Kaitlyn Schallhorn, Texas Abortion Bill Criticized for ‘Forcing’ Women to Buy ‘Rape Insurance’, 
FOX NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/08/09/texas-abortion-bill-
criticized-for-forcing-women-to-buy-rape-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/R9NZ-K6XJ] (“As a 
legislator, a lawyer and a mother of two girls, I think the fact that rape insurance is even being discussed 
by this body is repulsive . . . .”). 
21. See Kinsey Hasstedt & Adam Sonfield, At It Again: Texas Continues to Undercut Access to 
Reproductive Health Care, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/ 
2017/07/it-again-texas-continues-undercut-access-reproductive-health-care [https://perma.cc/ 
8W6J-ZMA5] (“[Texas] has spent years crippling a once-successful program supporting family 
planning and related services for low-income residents—all in service of an ideological agenda to shut 
out and shut down health centers that have any connection to abortion services.”). 
22. Press Release, Office of the Tex. Governor, supra note 7. 
23. Najmabadi, supra note 3. 
24. See Schallhorn, supra note 20 (“Democrats who spoke out against the bill said they did so 
because it would ‘force’ women to buy insurance in case of a rape.”). 
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something like that and buy supplemental insurance to cover that horrific 
possibility is not only ridiculous, it is cruel.”25 
This controversy is not unique to Texas.26  Currently, twenty-five states 
have restricted abortion coverage in plans offered through their health 
insurance exchanges.27  Limitations on coverage for abortion vary from 
state to state; however, most seek to restrict abortion coverage to very 
specific circumstances.28 
The wave of state restrictions is largely in response to the passage of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).29  Several states 
challenged the provisions of the PPACA individual mandate by enacting 
laws prohibiting or severely limiting coverage of abortion in an insurance 
plan offered under the PPACA.30  Consequently, cases came up in several 
jurisdictions challenging these restrictive statutes, which often resemble 
 
25. Najmabadi, supra note 3. 
26. See Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2017), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/restricting-insurance-coverage-abortion [https:// 
perma.cc/KP6J-BUX5] (“[R]estrictive state abortion insurance policies are not a new phenomenon.  
Several states already restrict private insurance coverage of abortion; these restrictions also apply to 
plans sold on the exchanges.”). 
27. Id. 
28. See id. (“[Seven] states limit coverage to life endangerment[, and three] states limit coverage 
to life endangerment and ‘substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.’”).  
Furthermore, “[twenty-one] states restrict abortion coverage in insurance plans for public 
employees. . . .  [Ten] states limit coverage to some combination of life endangerment, threat to the 
woman’s health, rape, incest[,] or fetal abnormality[; two] states prohibit any abortion coverage[; 
eighteen] states have more than one of the above restrictions.”  Id.; see also Thomas J. Molony, Roe, 
Casey, and Sex-Selection Abortion Bans, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2014) (“Legislative efforts 
have accelerated recently, with states such as Texas, North Dakota, Kansas, and North Carolina 
adopting new abortion laws in the face of strong opposition by pro-choice advocates.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
29. See Lara Cartwright-Smith, Benefit or Burden?  Religious Employers and the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s Contraception Coverage Mandate, 18 NEXUS 29, 29 (2013) (“One of the most 
significant and controversial components of the 2010 health reform law, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), is the preventive services mandate.  This mandate requires group health 
plans and insurance issuers to cover specified preventive services without cost-sharing.”). 
30. See, e.g., J. Daniel Seifker, Jr., Comment, Louisiana’s Abortion Politics and the Constitution: The 
Attempt to Regulate Health Insurance Benefits in the Wake of National Healthcare Reform, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. 
L. 253, 254 (2011) (“[T]he Louisiana legislature declared its objective during the summer of 2010 to 
absolutely prohibit ‘health care plan[s] required to be established’ in Louisiana ‘through an exchange 
pursuant to federal health reform legislation enacted by the 111th Congress’ from offering coverage 
for ‘abortion services.’ Through passing Act 941 . . . the legislature stated its intent to chip away at 
insurance coverage that uniquely affects women—the coverage of abortions. The legislature anchored 
its reasoning on the ‘longstanding policy of [Louisiana] to protect the right to life of the unborn child 
from conception by prohibiting abortion impermissible only because of the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting 2010 La. Acts 941)). 
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H.B. 214.31  For example, in 2013 the U.S. District Court of Kansas 
examined a series of laws passed by the Kansas legislature that sought to 
regulate abortion services, including a provision prohibiting “insurance 
companies from covering ‘elective’ abortions in their comprehensive health 
insurance policies delivered, issued for delivery, amended, or renewed on or 
after July 1, 2011.”32  Insurance providers in Kansas were only able to offer 
coverage for elective abortion through a separate, additional policy, which 
was required to independently and “fully cover the cost of elective abortions 
per enrollee as determined on an average actuarial basis.”33 
The plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Kansas and 
West Missouri, citing several employees who lost coverage under the new 
law, challenged the provision on multiple grounds, including the undue 
burden it imposed on a woman’s right to access abortion.34  The defendant 
moved for summary judgment and argued that “even if the Act imposes a 
burden, the burden is not undue” because the restriction did not affect “a 
woman’s ability to make a decision to have an abortion [but rather] her 
ability to pay the financial cost of procuring an abortion . . . .”35  The 
District Court of Kansas rejected this distinction, noting the restriction 
placed on insurance coverage “burdens women’s ability to pay using private 
funds, which is fundamentally different from refusing to provide state funds 
to women to pay for abortions.”36 
 
31. See Cartwright-Smith, supra note 29, at 30 (“As of the time of this writing, forty-three cases 
have been filed arguing that the ACA’s preventative services mandate is unconstitutional because it 
requires individuals, and particularly employers, to either violate their religious beliefs or pay a penalty 
for refusing to do so.”). 
32. ACLU of Kan. & W. Mo. v. Praeger, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1182 (D. Kan. 2013).  The 
Kansas statutory provision defined elective abortion as “any abortion for any reason other than to 
prevent the death of the mother upon whom the abortion is performed.”  Id.  The Act made no 
exceptions for abortions necessary to prevent severe or permanent harm to the woman’s health to the 
extent that “such effects would not lead to the death of the mother[,]” even in cases of potential organ 
failure, disability, or loss of fertility.  Id.  Furthermore, the Act included “no exceptions for the health 
of the mother, for a nonviable fetus, or for pregnancies that result from rape or incest.”  Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See ACLU of Kan. & W. Mo. v. Praeger, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1207 (D. Kan. 2011) 
(“[S]eeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt enforcement of a Kansas statute which took effect 
on July 1, 2011.  A portion of the statute essentially prohibits insurance companies in Kansas from 
providing coverage for ‘elective’ abortion services under comprehensive health insurance policies.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
35. Praeger, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. 
36. Id. at 1188; see also id. (“The first is an added burden, while the second is only a refusal to 
remove a burden.”). 
8
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The court made several findings, including the recognition of several 
plaintiffs who have lost “their insurance coverage for abortion because of 
the Act” or will lose such coverage upon renewal.37  The court further noted 
that “[s]ome members are unable to purchase a rider to their policy to cover 
abortions because some insurance companies have not made such riders 
available.”38  Additionally, the court found that of the members who would 
lose coverage, some “would consider abortion,” but paying for the 
procedure without insurance would “impose financial difficulties.”39  
Ultimately, the court denied the summary judgment motion because the 
undisputed facts “create[d] a genuine issue of material fact concerning 
whether the Act imposes an undue burden on women seeking an insurance-
funded abortion in Kansas.”40 
Compare this with a case out of the District Court of Vermont, where a 
state insurance statute was challenged because it allegedly infringed on the 
policyholders genuinely held religious beliefs.41  This case arose when a 
Vermont man challenged a provision within his insurance policy which used 
his premiums to provide coverage for non-federally funded (NFF) abortion 
services.42  Abortion services were subsidized through a separate fund 
raised from premiums charged in all health insurance policies offered 
through Vermont’s health benefit exchange.43  The plaintiff argued that 
 
37. Praeger, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Praeger, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.  Cf. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n of Rhode Island v. Garrahy, 598 F. 
Supp. 1374, 1384 (D. R.I. 1984), aff’d, 779 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding unconstitutional a state 
provision prohibiting coverage of abortion procedures in insurance plans, reasoning “the statute 
imposes a surcharge on women wishing privately to insure against the risk of abortion.  The state’s 
imposition of this surcharge on privately financed insurance is precisely the sort of affirmative 
‘obstacle’ which Maher and Harris stated the government was prohibited from creating”). 
 41. Howe v. Burwell, No. 2:15-cv-6, 2015 WL 4479757, at *15 (D. Vt. July 21, 2015). 
 42. Id. at *2. 
43. Id. at *1.  “Under the ACA, an insurer offering a health insurance plan has a ‘[v]oluntary 
choice [to provide] coverage of abortion services[.]’  The ACA thus neither requires health insurers to 
provide coverage for NFF abortion services, nor prohibits them from doing so.”  Id. at *2 (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(1)).  However, “[p]ursuant to the Hyde Amendment, federal funds may not be 
used to pay for abortion services except in the case of rape, incest, or danger to the life of the mother.”  
Id.  Therefore, in compliance with the Hyde Amendment, “a health insurer that chooses to offer 
coverage for NFF abortion services must segregate a portion of each subscriber’s premium as a 
‘separate payment’ to pay for those services . . . and place that money into a separate account . . . .”  Id. 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(2)(D)(ii)(III)).  The provider must pay for all NFF abortion services out 
of this account.  Id.  “Every health insurance plan offered on VHC [the Vermont health benefit 
exchange program] at this time provides coverage for NFF abortion services.”  Id. at *3. 
9
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forcing him to pay for NFF abortion services was “contrary to his genuinely 
held religious beliefs, violate[d] his constitutional rights, and fail[ed] to 
reflect accommodations to which he is entitled” under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).44  The defendants countered that “any 
burden on Plaintiff’s religious beliefs is supported by a compelling 
governmental interest in providing universal health insurance while 
complying with the Hyde Amendment . . . [and] that they have chosen the 
least restrictive means of furthering that interest.”45 
Because the plaintiff only needed to “plausibly allege that the . . . 
enforcement of certain provisions of the [PP]ACA imposes substantial 
burdens on his religious beliefs[,]” the court granted the plaintiff’s request 
for a declaratory judgment, stating “that [the plaintiff] is entitled to a 
religious accommodation under RFRA that will permit any health insurer 
from whom he obtains health insurance coverage to refrain from collecting 
a separate payment from him . . . .”46  The court reasoned that the granted 
relief would “assist in ensuring that Plaintiff will not pay for NFF abortion 
services in contravention to his genuinely held religious beliefs.”47 
These disparate findings, and divergent results, suggest that no clear 
consensus will emerge from lower courts as they continue to litigate the 
intricacies of providing insurance coverage for abortion.  Therefore, even if 
legislation restricting the coverage of abortion between states cite similar 
interests and achieve similar ends, challenges to the legislation in court will 
likely be decided based on that particular state’s proposed interests and the 
burden it imposes on women seeking an abortion in that state.  This is due 
to the highly individualized nature of each state’s respective health market 
exchange plans and the specific limitations on insurance coverage of 
abortion put forth by each state’s legislature.  Ultimately, we will likely be 
left with splintering and inconsistent holdings between various 
jurisdictions.48 
 
44. Id. at *1. 
45. Id. at *15. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. For example, under Vermont’s health benefit exchange plan, 100% of the plans offered 
included a separate payment provision, in which a portion of the insured’s premium payment is 
allocated to cover NFF abortion procedures.  However, in states that offer plans in which a separate 
payment is not diverted to cover NFF abortion procedures, the challenges that arise, as well as the 
reasoning of the court, will differ. 
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B. The Regulatory Regime of H.B. 214 
Upon enactment of H.B. 214, Texas joined the ranks of twenty-five 
fellow states in regulating insurance coverage of abortion.49  H.B. 214 was 
first read on July 18, 2017, and signed by both the House and Senate on 
August 14, 2017.50  Governor Greg Abbott signed the bill the very next 
day.51  However, H.B. 214 only applies to qualified health plans issued or 
renewed after April 1, 2018.52 
The substance of H.B. 214 serves to amend the Texas Insurance Code by 
“prohibit[ing] a qualified health plan offered through a health benefit 
exchange administered by the federal government or created under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act from providing coverage for 
elective abortion.”53  However, in order to receive coverage for an elective 
abortion, a woman must purchase “supplemental coverage for elective 
abortion under a health benefit plan other than a qualified health plan 
offered through a health benefit exchange.”54  As previously stated, 
coverage for elective abortion under a health benefit plan in Texas cannot 
be provided unless: 
(1) the coverage is provided to an enrollee separately from other health benefit plan 
coverage offered by the health benefit plan issuer; (2) the enrollee pays the 
 
49. See S. Comm. on Bus. & Commerce, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), 
at 1 (“Texas is one of [twenty-five] states yet to enact legislation to ban abortion coverage offered 
through the federally mandated Texas health exchange marketplace.”); see also State Bans on Insurance 
Coverage of Abortion Endanger Women’s Health and Take Health Benefits Away from Women, NAT’L WOMEN’S 
L. CTR. (Apr. 2014), https://www.nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/state_bans_on_abortion_ 
covg_factsheet_4.7.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/645F-M8DU] (describing twenty-four states in which 
health insurance plans providing for abortion have or will be banned). 
50. See H.J. of Tex., 85th Leg., 1st C.S. 41, 43–44 (2017) (fourth day) (showing H.B. 214 was 
first read and referred to committees on July 24, 2017); see also S.J. of Tex., 85th Leg., 1st C.S. 401, 406 
(2017) (tenth day) (indicating the Senate signed H.B. 214 on August 14, 2017); H.J. of Tex., 85th Leg., 
1st C.S. 447, 520 (2017) (twenty-first day) (indicating the House signed H.B. 214 on August 15, 2017). 
 51. See H.J. of Tex., 85th Leg., 1st C.S. 523, 577 (2017) (twenty-second day) (indicating the 
governor signed H.B. 214 on August 15, 2017). 
52. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 4 (“The bill 
would take effect December 1, 2017, and would apply to a qualified health plan offered through a 
health benefit exchange or a health benefit plan issued on or after April 1, 2018.”). 
53. H. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 1; see 
also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1696.001(1) (defining “[e]lective abortion” as “an abortion . . . other than 
an abortion performed due to a medical emergency as defined by Section 171.002, Health and Safety 
Code”); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1696.001(2) (defining “[h]ealth benefit exchange” as an “American 
Health Benefit Exchange administered by the federal government or created under Section 1311(b) of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”). 
54. INS. § 1696.002(b). 
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premium for coverage for elective abortion separately from, and in addition to, the 
premium for other health benefit plan coverage, if any; and (3) the enrollee 
provides a signature for coverage for elective abortion, separately and distinct from the 
signature required for other health benefit plan coverage, if any, provided to 
the enrollee by the health benefit plan issuer.55 
Prior to the enactment of H.B. 214, insurance companies in Texas were 
able to offer coverage for abortion services without requiring an additional 
policy or premium.56  Women in Texas whose health insurance plans 
currently offer coverage for elective abortion services will lose this coverage 
unless it is separately contracted for after April 1, 2018.57 
III.    H.B. 214 OUGHT TO BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER 
THE SUPREME COURT CASE LAW ON REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY 
By restricting coverage of elective abortions in this manner, the Texas 
legislature placed a clear and undue burden on a woman’s constitutional 
right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy.  Further, the bill bears 
an irrational connection between the state interests put forth and the 
restriction imposed. 
 
55. Id. § 1218.004 (emphasis added). 
56. Cf. Galvin, supra note 3 (observing that Texans who had insurance plans which provided 
coverage for abortion services will no longer have such coverage after the passage of H.B. 214). 
57. See id. (“[H.B. 214] will impact people who have coverage and will now be denied 
services . . . .”).  See generally H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), 
at 2–3 (stating H.B. 214 applies to all insurance plans offered by: “an insurance company, a group 
hospital service corporation, a fraternal benefit society, a stipulated premium company, a reciprocal 
exchange, a health maintenance organization, an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
group health plan that holds a certificate of authority, or a nonprofit health corporation that holds a 
certificate of authority.  It also would apply to: group health coverage made available by a school 
district; a basic coverage plan under the Texas Employees Group Benefits Act; a basic plan under the 
Texas Public School Employees Group Benefits Program; a primary care coverage plan under the 
Texas School Employees Uniform Group Health Coverage Act; basic coverage under the Uniform 
Insurance Benefits Act for employees of the University of Texas and Texas A&M systems; a small or 
large employer health benefit plan subject to the Health Insurance Portability and Availability Act 
(HIPAA) in Insurance Code, ch. 1501; and a consumer choice of benefits plan issued under Insurance 
Code, ch. 1507.”). 
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A. The Constitutional Basis for a Woman’s Right to Choose 
1. From the Trimester Framework to the Undue Burden Standard 
Today, it is well established that women have a constitutional right to 
choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.58  This right is commonly 
understood to be embedded in the right to privacy found within the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.59  The Supreme Court first 
established the framework for a woman’s right to choose in Roe v. Wade,60 
and the specifics of this right have since been hotly contested and often 
challenged.61  Because a woman’s right to choose is rooted in and shaped 
by case law, it is helpful to examine not only the doctrine laid out in 
Roe v. Wade, but also the progeny of cases that followed, which both 
modified and reaffirmed a woman’s right to choose. 
On January 22, 1973, when the Supreme Court issued their opinion in 
Roe v. Wade, the Court formally established a constitutional right for a 
 
58. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), modified, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (concluding “the 
right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision,” and further that the right “is not unqualified 
and must be considered against important state interests in regulation”). 
59. The right to privacy is generally found in the penumbra of rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (explaining that 
although a protection or right is not explicitly “mentioned in the Constitution [or] in the Bill of 
Rights[,]” it may nevertheless still be recognized, and thereby protected, as a constitutional right under 
the penumbra of the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights).  Thus, the roots of the constitutional 
right to privacy regarding reproductive matters, such as the right to choose whether to terminate a 
pregnancy, are not found in the text of the Constitution, but rather in case law.  See Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (holding the right for a woman to decide to terminate her 
pregnancy “is a ‘liberty’ protected against state interference by the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) 
(recognizing “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child”). 
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), modified, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
61. Compare Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection for Abortion Rights 
Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 471 (2009) (arguing “[s]everal years 
after Roe, the Court approved laws that denied poor women and young women full access to abortion” 
(footnotes omitted)), and Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants: Using Sex Equality 
Arguments to Demand Examination of the Legitimacy of State Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 377, 389 (2011) (“Since the 1970s, anti-abortion strategists have pursued a remarkably 
consistent and successful strategy to attack Roe v. Wade . . . .”), with Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: 
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 262 
(1992) (“Constitutional critics of the abortion right [argue] that the privacy analysis Roe employed to 
protect the abortion decision lacks textual support in the Constitution, [question] whether the abortion 
decision deserves the same protection as other rights of privacy, and [attack] Roe’s trimester framework 
as imposing unreasonable restraints on the state’s interest in protecting potential life.”). 
13
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woman to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy before viability of the 
fetus.62  The Court began their analysis by first acknowledging that the State 
may validly assert legitimate and compelling interests “in safeguarding 
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life[,]” 
and further that the right for a woman to choose whether to terminate her 
pregnancy must be considered against these important state interests.63  In 
order to provide a foundation for deciding when regulation was appropriate, 
the Court put forth a trimester framework, under which the compelling 
point for legislative regulation in the interest of preserving the health of the 
mother was “approximately the end of the first trimester,”64 and the 
compelling point for regulation made in the interest of the potential life of 
the unborn fetus was viability.65  The trimester framework established in 
Roe v. Wade, established the right for a woman to choose whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy before the point of viability as determined by 
trimester.66 
In the decades following Roe v. Wade, the amount of litigation related to 
abortion regulations and women’s newfound right to choose increased 
drastically.67  These cases were largely concerned with whether a particular 
abortion regulation was constitutional in light of Roe v. Wade.68  Of these 
 
62. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes 
the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important 
state interests in regulation.”); see also Linda L. Schlueter, 40th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade: Reflections Past, 
Present and Future, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 105, 108 (2013) (“[A] woman has a fundamental right under 
the United States Constitution to decide whether to end her pregnancy.”). 
63. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54. 
64. Id. at 164. 
65. Id. at 164–65; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) 
(“[L]egislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification.  
But courts may not.  We must justify the lines we draw. And there is no line other than viability which 
is more workable.”).  See generally Viable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining viable 
as “capable of living . . . outside the womb”). 
66. See ARIENS, supra note `19, at 421 (“[T]he right of an individual to decide whether to have 
an abortion [before the point of viability] . . . belongs to the pregnant woman.”). 
67. See id. at 422–23 (providing a timeline of seventeen cases regarding regulation of abortion 
that went before the Supreme Court between 1973–1993). 
68. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973) (“[W]e hold that the [requirement that an 
abortion take place in a] JCAH-accredited hospital . . . and the requirements as to approval by the 
hospital abortion committee, as to confirmation by two independent physicians, and as to residence in 
Georgia are all violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  For additional examples compare Hodgson 
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 457–58 (1990) (holding a parental notice requirement that the minor 
receive consent from both parents before abortion unconstitutional, and a 48-hour statutory waiting 
period for minors constitutional), Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979) (holding the imposition 
of a requirement that a physician determine viability of fetus before performing abortion 
14
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decisions, perhaps the most notable is Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in which 
the Supreme Court replaced the trimester framework with the “undue 
burden” standard.69 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court examined five provisions 
of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, including several 
consent provisions requiring parental consent for minors, spousal consent 
for married women, and informed consent for all patients.70  The Court 
began their analysis by expressing disappointment that nearly nineteen years 
after holding the Constitution “protects a woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy in its early stages, that definition of liberty is still questioned.”71  
The Court then reaffirmed the principles of Roe v. Wade by recognizing the 
balance between the “right of the woman to choose to have an abortion 
before viability[,]” and the State’s legitimate interest “in protecting the health 
of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”72 
Although the Court began by reaffirming “Roe’s essential holding,”73 the 
Supreme Court ultimately rejected the trimester framework in favor of an 
undue burden standard.74  Under the undue burden standard, a restriction 
on abortion is unconstitutional “if its purpose or effect is to place substantial 
obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability.”75  The Court provided the following reasoning to justify the shift 
to the undue burden standard: 
 
unconstitutional), and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (holding a parental notice requirement 
mandating the minor receive consent from both parents or judicial waiver prior to undergoing abortion 
unconstitutional), with Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989) (holding a 
requirement that physicians use prudent judgment when evaluating the viability of a fetus, prohibitions 
against performance of abortion in public facilities or by public employees, and prohibitions on the 
use of public funds for abortion counseling, constitutional), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326–
27 (1980) (holding a mandatory prohibition against the use of federal funds to subsidize abortions 
sought by indigent women, even when necessary to preserve the health of the mother, constitutional). 
69. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
70. Id. at 844. 
71. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
72. Id. at 846. 
 73. Id. 
74. Id. at 878. 
75. Id.  The shift from the trimester framework to the undue burden standard did more than 
change how courts review abortion restrictions.  By applying an “undue burden intermediate test,” 
rather than the trimester framework created under a strict scrutiny standard, “the Court seems to have 
demoted the right to make decisions concerning abortion . . . to quasi-fundamental status, down from 
its pure Roe-era position as a fundamental right.”  Roy G. Spece, Jr., The Purpose Prong of Casey’s Undue 
Burden Test and its Impact on the Constitutionality of Abortion Insurance Restrictions in the Affordable Care Act or 
its Progeny, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 77, 79 (2011). But see Julie F. Kowitz, Not Your Garden Variety Tort 
15
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[T]he means chosen by the State to further [their] interest in potential life must 
be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.  And a statute 
which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state 
interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its 
legitimate ends.76 
Applying this standard, the Court found all but the spousal consent 
provisions to be constitutional.77  The Court reasoned that while the 
informed consent provision may inevitably make obtaining an abortion 
more expensive and less convenient, only the spousal consent requirement 
would likely prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an 
abortion due to abuse or disapproval from their husbands.78 
2. Expanding the Undue Burden Standard: Two Prongs Become 
Three 
The undue burden standard put forth in Planned Parenthood v. Casey is the 
predominant test used today to determine the constitutionality of 
restrictions on abortion.79  The standard is understood as having two 
prongs, either of which is sufficient to render a restriction 
unconstitutional.80  The first prong is known as the purpose prong, while the 
latter is known as the effect prong.81  Under these prongs, a statute will be 
found unconstitutional if either (1) its purpose “is to place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
 
Reform; Statutes Barring Claims for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth are Unconstitutional under the Purpose Prong 
of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 235, 238 (1995) (“At the same time as the Casey 
plurality lowered the constitutional standard of review for laws that affect the right to choose abortion, 
Casey expanded the scope of legislation that would be subject to that review.”). 
76. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
77. Id. at 900. 
78. Id. at 901. 
79. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (“Before viability, a State ‘may not 
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.  It also may not 
impose upon this right an undue burden, which exists if a regulation’s ‘purpose or effect is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.’” 
(citations omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79)). 
80. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is 
invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion before the fetus attains viability.”). 
81. See Spece, supra note 75, at 101 (“[T]he purpose prong is itself [a] standard of review, which 
flatly proscribes government actions that have an improper purpose. [ ]The same is true concerning its 
twin standard–the effects prong of the undue burden test.[ ]”). 
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viability” or (2) its effect places a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”82  This standard is 
meant to prevent a state from outright prohibiting abortion, or 
implementing procedures which substantially impair a woman’s ability to 
make the decision to terminate her pregnancy;83 however, “[r]egulations 
which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . 
may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if 
they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to 
choose.”84 
Recently, the Supreme Court expanded upon the undue burden standard 
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.85  In Hellerstedt, the Court examined 
two provisions of Texas House Bill 2 (H.B. 2) being challenged by a small 
group of Texas abortion providers.86  The first provision, known as the 
“admitting-privileges requirement,” required any “physician performing or 
inducing an abortion” to have “active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . 
located not further than [thirty] miles from the” abortion facility.87  The 
second provision, known as the “surgical-center requirement,” mandated 
that an abortion facility “meet the minimum standards for ambulatory 
surgical centers.”88 
The Court began their examination of the constitutionality of these 
provisions by adding an additional threshold test to the undue burden 
standard, requiring the examining court to “interrogate the veracity of 
healthcare claims underlying abortion restrictions[,]” before balancing “the 
purported health benefits of an abortion regulation against the burdens 
placed upon women’s access to abortion-related healthcare.”89  Utilizing 
 
82. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
83. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146. 
84. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.  Therefore, a state is allowed to promote childbirth over abortion as 
a matter of policy, but it may not implement arbitrary restrictions on the practice in pursuit of this 
agenda.  See Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (“[T]he Constitution does not 
forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal 
childbirth . . . .” (quoting Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977))); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464, 474 (1977) (“[The right to choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy] implies no limitation 
on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to 
implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”). 
85. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
86. Id. at 2300. 
87. Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)). 
88. Id. at 2314. 
89. Yvonne Lindgren, The Doctor Requirement: Griswold, Privacy, and At-Home Reproductive Care, 
32 CONST. COMMENT. 341, 353 (2017). 
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this additional threshold, the Court ultimately found the requirements at 
issue “place[d] a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a 
previability abortion, constitute[d] an undue burden on abortion access, and 
thus violate[d] the Constitution.”90 
The Court reasoned that because (1) the State failed to provide an 
evidentiary basis to substantiate its claim that the proposed restrictions 
protected women’s health, and (2) there was a “virtual absence of any health 
benefit” perceivable on the face of the regulations, H.B. 2 placed an 
unjustifiable, and thus undue, burden on abortion access.91  The Court 
found especially compelling the detrimental effect on women’s access to 
abortion-related healthcare the restrictions imposed and ultimately failed to 
find the justifications put forth by the State compelling enough to warrant 
such a detriment on a woman’s right to choose.92 
The recent holding in Hellerstedt suggests an expansion to the undue 
burden standard through the addition of the threshold of veracity.  
Following the precedent put forth by this holding, it seems a statute can be 
found to be unduly burdensome, and thus unconstitutional, if it fails to 
satisfy either the purpose or effect prong of the undue burden standard, or, if 
upon “interrogat[ing] the veracity of [the] healthcare claims underlying 
abortion restrictions[,]” the examining court finds the regulation lacks any 
health benefit and is a significant detriment to the accessibility of abortion.93 
B. H.B. 214 Universally Fails the Undue Burden Standard 
As it stands, H.B. 214 is yet to be challenged (likely because the provision 
is still so new).94  However, if and when such a case arises, the reviewing 
court will almost certainly apply the undue burden standard because the 
undue burden standard applies “whenever there is no per se impermissible 
intrusion, but there is a substantial risk that a government abortion 
restriction will trench on the woman’s quasi-fundamental right to an 
 
90. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2298. 
91. Id. 
92. See id. at 2299 (“[The] evidence, along with the absence of any contrary evidence, supports 
the District Court’s conclusions, including its ultimate legal conclusion that requirement is not 
necessary.”); see also Dania Y. Pulido, Comment, When Giving Birth Becomes a Liability: The Intersection of 
Reproductive Oppression and the Motherhood Wage Penalty for Latinas in Texas, 19 SCHOLAR 111, 115 (2016) 
(“[I]n many instances, H.B. 2 required women to travel over 100 miles to procure an abortion.”). 
93. Lindgren, supra note 89, at 352–53. 
94. See Galvin, supra note 3 (stating “abortion activists were weighing their options as to whether 
they should challenge the law in court”). 
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abortion.”95  H.B. 214 provides the perfect avenue for Texas courts to again 
become embroiled in a litigation battle over the undue burden standard and 
abortion restrictions; however, in the event such a case is filed, it is likely 
H.B. 214 would succumb to the same fate as its predecessor, H.B. 2.96 
1. H.B. 214 Is the Most Recent Attempt by the Texas Legislature 
to Systematically Advance a Pro-Life Political Agenda 
Although application of the undue burden standard appears simple, it can 
be more difficult than initially thought to ascertain the true purpose of any 
legislative measure,97 much less a loaded legislative measure that pertains to 
abortion restrictions.98  Under the purpose prong of the undue burden 
standard, the reviewing court may look to the following factors in 
ascertaining the purpose of the legislature: 
[The] passing [of] a limitation that is admitted to be unconstitutional . . . ; 
legislative history . . . ; the language of the enactment; a bill’s social and 
historical context; “other legislation concerning the same subject matter;” the 
creation of substantial, likely insurmountable obstacles to fulfillment of the 
right involved; and . . . .  the failure to use less restrictive alternatives or the 
enactment of patently ineffective legislation . . . .99 
For a purpose to be improper, it must “place substantial obstacles in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”100  
Furthermore, the “improper purpose does not have to be either the sole or 
predominant purpose, but only a substantial causative factor.”101 
 
95. Spece, supra note 75, at 98. 
96. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2298 (finding H.B. 2 placed a substantial obstacle in a woman’s 
path to abortion and consequently holding the provision to be unconstitutional). 
97. Spece, supra note 75, at 99. 
98. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7 (describing the purported purpose of H.B. 214). 
99. Spece, supra note 75, at 99; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) 
(“[D]iscriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of 
consequences.  It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action 
at least in part ‘because of[]’ . . . its adverse effects . . . .” (quoting Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979))); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A] forbidden 
purpose may be gleaned both from the structure of the legislation and from examination of the process 
that led to its enactment.” (quoting Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566, 567 (9th Cir. 1996))); Gillian 
E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2030 (1994) (“In order to satisfy the purpose prong, the state cannot seek to 
hinder a woman’s choice . . . .”). 
100. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992). 
101. Spece, supra note 75, at 100. 
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According to the Texas Legislature, H.B. 214 was passed in the interest 
of ensuring “taxpayer funds are not used to cover the costs associated with 
health benefit plans that cover elective abortions and to  provide choices for 
private insurance marketplace consumers who prefer not to purchase a plan 
that covers elective abortions.”102  Additionally, in the same legislative 
session in which H.B. 214 passed, the Texas legislature considered several 
other provisions regarding abortion.103  Two measures other than H.B. 214 
passed both the house and senate: the first (H.B. 13) “requires health care 
providers to report more details about abortion complications[,]” while the 
second (H.B. 215) “requires doctors to report more details on whether 
minors receiving abortions did so as a result of parental consent or a judicial 
bypass.”104  The third and final measure regarding abortion sought to 
“broaden the existing state and federal bans on abortion funding by 
prohibiting Texas governmental entities from entering into any contractual 
relationships with clinics affiliated with abortion providers[;]” this provision 
passed in the senate, but did not pass in the house.105 
Furthermore, Governor Greg Abbott is not shy in expressing his openly 
pro-life stance.  As previously mentioned, shortly after the passing of 
H.B. 214, Governor Greg Abbott released a statement characterizing the 
bill as “an important piece of [his] pro-life agenda,” and as something he 
was proud to sign because of the bill’s purported ability to “protect innocent 
life” and ensure “no Texan is ever required to pay for a procedure that ends 
the life of an unborn child[.]”106  Incidentally, H.B. 214 was filed on July 24, 
2017,107 only one year after the Supreme Court struck down Texas H.B. 2 
as unconstitutional because the provisions contained therein “place[d] a 
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion, 
[and] constitute[d] an undue burden on abortion access[.]”108 
 
102. H. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 1. 
103. See Poinsett, supra note 1, at 594–95 (summarizing all enacted legislation of the eighty-fifth 
Texas Legislature’s special session, including four abortion provisions, three of which passed both the 
House and Senate). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 595. 
106. Press Release, Office of the Tex. Governor, supra note 7. 
107. See generally H.J. of Tex., 85th Leg., 1st C.S. 41, 43–44 (2017) (providing a comprehensive 
list of bills, including H.B. 214, that were “laid before the house, read [for the] first time, and referred 
to committees” on July 24, 2017). 
108. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2298 (2016); see also Galvin, supra 
note 3 (“In the regular session, the Texas Legislature passed a sweeping anti-abortion bill, just one year 
after the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a law that had forced more than half of the state’s abortion 
clinics to close.”). 
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While any of the factors above may not alone rise to the level of an 
improper purpose, when taken together in context, they create a pattern on 
the part of the Texas Legislature to systematically impede the ability of Texas 
women to seek and have access to abortion.  Although proponents of the 
bill cite worthy motives (i.e., religious beliefs) in seeking to avoid 
contributing to abortion procedures, “there remains a clear, unitary, and 
[indistinguishable] intent to restrict abortion.”109 
Furthermore, although the bill and its proponents formally list an interest 
in ensuring “taxpayer funds are not used to cover the costs associated with 
health benefit plans that cover elective abortions[,]”110 it is clear from the 
myriad of other abortion restrictions released in a short period of time, as 
well as the statements promulgated by the Governor himself, that a pro-life 
political agenda serves as a substantive causative factor in creating these 
legislative measures. 
However, under the purpose prong, it is not enough for the bill merely to 
have an improper purpose; the purpose must also place a significant obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.111  Due to the pro-life agenda 
championed by the Texas Governor and Legislature, Texas women have 
had to filibuster, protest, and litigate their way to a right to choose that is 
more than illusory.112  Now, in the interest of “economic freedom,” women 
in Texas will have to make separate contractual arrangements and additional 
payments for insurance coverage that was once affordable and easily 
attainable.113  Moreover, the bill will disproportionately affect low-income 
women in Texas who rely on public insurance programs (which, as 
mentioned above, are undoubtedly covered by the prohibition), and struggle 
to maintain the coverage they have, much less procure additional coverage 
 
109. Spece, supra note 75, at 102. 
110. H. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 1. 
111. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (“An undue burden 
exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion . . . .”). 
112. See, e.g., Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2298 (adjudicating H.B. 2, a Texas statute imposing two 
distinct regulations on abortion access and procedures, to be unconstitutional); see also Harriet Sinclair, 
Texas Abortion Bill Makes Woman Buy ‘Rape Insurance,’ Critics Say, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 10, 2017, 6:24 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/texas-votes-abortion-bill-critics-say-would-make-woman-buy-rape-insur 
ance-649548 [https://perma.cc/M6F9-49N7] (depicting a photo of women protesting for their right 
to choose). 
113. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 5 
(discussing how H.B. 214 might lead some women who would need to seek an abortion in extenuating 
circumstances, such as an illness or medical emergency, to discover that their insurance would not 
cover the costs because such coverage was not contracted and paid for separately). 
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at a higher or additional premium.114  H.B. 214 serves as merely the most 
recent in a long line of Texas abortion restrictions that stigmatize and seek 
to make an already agonizing, expensive procedure unattainable. 
Because H.B. 214 is justified by an improper purpose, even if not the sole 
purpose, and places a significant obstacle in the way of Texas women 
seeking abortion, it is likely that, when reviewed in context, H.B. 214 will 
fail to survive a constitutional challenge under the purpose prong of the undue 
burden standard. 
2. H.B. 214 Places a Substantial Obstacle in the Path of a Woman 
Seeking Abortion by Raising and Shifting Cost 
The effect prong of the undue burden standard “is fact-sensitive [and] 
requires a case-by-case investigation into all of the effects of a 
regulation[.]”115  Furthermore, the effects under examination “must be 
calculated from the perspective of those women for whom the regulation is 
a restriction[.]”116 
In Texas, approximately “53% of all pregnancies are unintended.”117  
Furthermore, a majority of the women seeking abortions in Texas are young 
and low-income.118  Additionally, “[a]bortion patients were less likely to 
have no health insurance coverage in 2014 than in 2008 (28% vs. 34%), 
likely because of the Affordable Care Act.”119  “[35%] of patients had 
 
114. See id. at 6 (“H.B. 214 disproportionately would affect low-income women who cannot 
afford to purchase supplemental insurance in addition to their basic health insurance plan.  Increasing 
the financial burden on women could incentivize them to seek unsafe abortion methods, which could 
endanger their lives.”). 
115. Metzger, supra note 99, at 2030. 
116. Id. 
117. Mariel Puryear, Comment, Hardline Ideology Stymies Real Results: Texas Lawmakers’ Battle Over 
Family Planning Leaves Texas Women Unprotected, 15 SCHOLAR 829, 831 (2013); see also Induced Abortion in 
the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-
abortion-united-states [https://perma.cc/D9VD-JJ6A] (indicating that in 2014, “[19%] of pregnancies 
(excluding miscarriages) . . . [in the United States] ended in abortion”). 
118. “In 2014, the majority of abortion patients (60%) were in their [twenties], and the second-
largest age-group was in their [thirties] (25%).”  Jenna Jerman et al., Characteristics of U.S. Abortion Patients 
in 2014 and Changes Since 2008, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/ 
report/characteristics-us-abortion-patients-2014 [https://perma.cc/JE38-KX6H].  “In 2014, three-
fourths of abortion patients were low income—49% living at less than the federal poverty level, and 
26% living at 100[%]–199% of the poverty level.”  Id.  Additionally, and almost ironically in this 
context, a majority of the “abortion patients reported a religious affiliation.”  Id. 
119. Id.; see also Neil Barton, Note, Warm Lessons from Our Frozen Neighbors: Reviewing the PPACA’s 
Effectiveness Through a Comparative Analysis with the Canada Health Act, 55 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 355, 
372–75 (2017) (explaining the PPACA “sought to improve the availability of health insurance for all 
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Medicaid coverage, 31% had private insurance[,] and 3% each had either 
insurance through HealthCare.gov or a different type of insurance.”120 
Because of the demographics of abortion patients in Texas, a tangible and 
immediate effect of H.B. 214 will be an increased cost of abortion services.  
The new premiums for coverage for an abortion, other than those 
performed to save the life of the mother, will be calculated so that an 
enrollee’s premium “fully cover[s] the estimated cost of elective abortion 
per enrollee[.]”121  Furthermore, “[w]hen calculating the premium, the 
issuer [may] not take into account any cost savings in other health benefit 
plan coverage that was estimated to result from coverage for elective 
abortion[,]” or “discount an enrollee’s premium[,] or reduce an enrollee’s 
premium on the basis that the enrollee had health benefit plan coverage for 
elective abortion.”122  This will most likely affect the women on Medicaid 
the fastest, as it was the “second-most-common method of payment” for 
abortion procedures in 2014 and has likely increased since the last time the 
data was made available.123  However, even women with private insurance 
are not guaranteed to maintain their existing coverage, and they will still have 
to pay an additional premium and contract separately for abortion coverage 
in accordance with H.B. 214.124 
Women, especially those in low-income communities, are already in 
positions where seeking an abortion can prove to be debilitatingly 
expensive.125  By further prohibiting coverage of an elective abortion, even 
 
Americans” in addition to reducing “the price of insurance through marketplace competition” and 
providing “an affordable health insurance option for individuals whose income is below 200% of the 
poverty line”). 
120. Jerman, supra note 118. 
121. H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 4. 
122. Id. 
123. Jerman, supra note 118. 
124. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 5 (stating 
“Texans could choose to carry a supplemental insurance plan for elective abortion coverage, if needed, 
or they could choose a private insurance plan that provided that coverage separately from the issuer’s 
other health coverage[,]” but not guaranteeing whether those with existing private insurance will be 
offered a separate plan or whether such plans will be cost effective or readily attainable). 
125. See Gu, supra note 12 (“A surgical abortion can cost up to $1[,]500 in the first trimester to 
around $10,000 in the second trimester.”); see also Research Brief: The Impact of Medicaid Coverage Restrictions 
on Abortion, IBIS REPROD. HEALTH 2 (Nov. 2015), https://ibisreproductivehealth.org/sites/default/ 
files/files/publications/ResearchBriefImpactofMedicaidRestrictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNW4-
Y35F] (“Explaining what it took for her to gather the money for her abortion, one [twenty-seven]-
year[-]old, low-income, [b]lack woman said, ‘It was hard, it took me three weeks. . . .  I don’t have a 
strong family support where I could borrow money from. . . .  The payday loan [I took out for my 
abortion] wiped out my entire account. . . .  I got a three-day notice on my apartment door . . . when I 
23
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in the case of rape or incest, and by only making allowances for medical 
emergencies as strictly defined by statute, the Texas Legislature imposed an 
undue burden on a woman’s constitutional right to choose by creating 
situations in which the choice is merely illusory. 
Although the government has no affirmative duty to provide abortion 
funding,126 H.B. 214 regulates abortion insurance as opposed to the 
abortion procedure itself.127  Requiring women to affirmatively opt in to 
insurance coverage for abortion could create “substantial anxiety or mental 
anguish [in women] even though they never turn out to seek an abortion[,]” 
and further deter them from seeking coverage out of fear or stigma, while 
others “will have lost or never gained insurance[,]” leaving them without 
meaningful access to abortion as mandated by their constitutionally 
protected right.128 
Because H.B. 214 has the effect of making an already cost-prohibitive 
procedure essentially unattainable both for those who cannot afford it and 
for those who do not foresee the need for such coverage until it is too late, 
 
became evicted I lived in a shelter temporarily.’” (alteration in original)); id. (describing the following 
experience of a young, white woman living on a low income and the hardship she encountered in 
raising money for her abortion: “I saved as much money as I could with still paying my rent and water 
and electric and car payment and child support and everything else that I have to pay. I ended up being 
late on my electric bill. . . .  You can’t have groceries when you don’t have electricity. . . .  Little things 
like that that you take for granted until you don’t have electricity, [you have] ice[-]cold showers and no 
groceries in the fridge.”).  See generally Abortion Patients are Disproportionately Poor and Low Income, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (May 9, 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/infographic/2016/abortion-patien 
ts-are-disproportionately-poor-and-low-income [https://perma.cc/CSQ4-YGVL] (“Nearly half of 
abortion patients in the United States are poor and another 26% are low income.”). 
126. See Aditi Gowri, Reproduction, Rights and Public Policy: A Framework for Assessment, 35 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 13, 14 (2000) (“For instance, U.S. Supreme Court decisions hold that a pregnant woman has 
a (negative) right to seek out abortion but no (positive) right to receive state assistance or the use of 
state funds in doing so.”). 
127. See supra Section II.B (describing the regulatory regime of H.B. 214). 
128. Roy G. Spece, Jr., Constitutional Attacks Against the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s 
“Mandating” that Certain Individuals and Employers Purchase Insurance While Restricting Purchase by 
Undocumented Immigrants and Women Seeking Abortion Coverage, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 489, 566 (2011).  But see 
id. at 565 (opining the Court could conclude “the government has not intruded upon the right to 
choose whether to have an abortion because any inability still exists because of the woman’s lack of 
sufficient wealth to directly purchase an abortion [or obtain supplemental coverage]”).  See generally 
Paula Abrams, Abortion Stigma: The Legacy of Casey, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 299, 300 (2014) (“A 
growing body of research attests to a culture of stigma surrounding abortion. Abortion stigma may 
negatively impact a woman’s experience of abortion. . . .  [A] culture of deviancy has developed around 
abortion.  In many states abortion is subject to regulations not imposed on other medical procedures.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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the bill is unlikely to survive scrutiny under the effect prong of the undue 
burden standard. 
3. H.B. 214 Fails the Threshold of Veracity Because It Does Not 
Regulate in the Interest of Health 
Evaluating courts are now authorized to evaluate “the veracity of 
healthcare claims underlying abortion restrictions” before balancing “the 
purported health benefits of an abortion regulation against the burdens 
placed upon women’s access to abortion-related healthcare.”129  In Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court found the claims underlying the 
challenged regulation lacked veracity where the State of Texas claimed 
H.B. 2 was enacted to protect women’s health, but further examination 
revealed a “virtual absence of any health benefit” resulting from the bill’s 
enactment.130  The Court thus examined not only the purpose and effect 
of the regulation in determining whether it imposed an undue burden but 
also the veracity of the factual basis underlying the regulation’s purported 
purpose.131 
As discussed above, the stated purpose of H.B. 214 is to ensure “taxpayer 
funds are not used to cover the costs associated with health benefit plans 
that cover elective abortions and to provide choices for private insurance 
marketplace consumers who prefer not to purchase a plan that covers 
elective abortions.”132  As opposed to H.B. 2, the drafters of H.B. 214 do 
not claim that the underlying purpose of the bill is healthcare related.133  
However, it is likely that the Court would allow factual consideration of the 
purpose provided, regardless of what that purpose may be, because the 
“Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings 
where constitutional rights are at stake.”134  Therefore, taking the stated 
 
129. Lindgren, supra note 89, at 353. 
130. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2298 (2016). 
131. Cf. id. at 2311 (explaining that although the stated purpose behind the admitting-privilege 
requirement “is to help ensure that women have easy access to a hospital should complications arise 
during an abortion procedure[,]” the evidence showed “no significant health-related problem for the 
new law to cure”). 
132. H. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 214, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017), at 1. 
133. See Najmabadi, supra note 3 (stating proponents of H.B. 214 claim the bill is “necessary to 
prevent those with moral, religious[,] and philosophical objections from having to pay for the 
procedure”). 
134. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)); see also 
id. at 2309 (“The rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes 
on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.” (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992))). 
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purpose at face value, it is unlikely that H.B. 214 would survive the threshold 
of veracity. 
Although the drafters of H.B. 214 claim to be concerned with the use of 
taxpayer funds for abortion, the bill does little more to protect taxpayers 
than legislation already in place.  For example, the PPACA, enacted on 
March 23, 2010 and later amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act, includes provisions allowing states to “enact legislation 
prohibiting qualified health plans operating in their Exchanges from 
offering abortion coverage.”135 
Furthermore, in addition to and in conjunction with the PPACA, the 
Hyde Amendment and the RFRA provide specific restrictions on the use of 
public funding for abortion services.136  These restrictions include a 
prohibition on the use of federal funds to subsidize abortion procedures, 
except in the case of rape, incest, or life endangerment (exceptions not 
found in H.B. 214).137 
Additionally, the PPACA itself provided full exemptions from the Health 
and Human Services mandates requiring abortifacient and contraceptive 
coverage for a limited number of organizations based on the following 
criterion: “(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the 
organization; (2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the 
religious beliefs of the organization; (3) The organization serves primarily 
persons who share the religious tenets of the organization; [and] (4) The 
 
135. Wilton B. Hyman, An Explanation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 38 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 579, 603 (2012).  After the passage of the PPACA, states were required “to create Health 
Insurance Exchanges that [offer] competing health insurance to individuals and small businesses[.]”  
Id. at 580.  Insurers are still able to offer coverage in the non-exchange individual market, “but only 
those plans purchased through the exchange are eligible for federal subsidies.”  Elizabeth Kukura, 
Giving Birth Under the ACA: Analyzing the Use of Law As a Tool to Improve Health Care, 94 NEB. L. REV. 
799, 821–22 (2016).  Essential minimum coverage requirements of each plan offered in the exchange 
are determined by the HHS Secretary and include the following: “ambulatory services, emergency care, 
hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance abuse, prescription drugs, 
rehabilitative and habilitative services, lab services, preventative and wellness services and chronic 
disease management, and pediatric care.”  Hyman, supra, at 600. 
136. See Maria Ioanna Pantelaki & Chloe White, Health Care: Access After Health Care Reform, 
15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 95, 118 (2014) (illustrating the passing of the PPACA required numerous 
concessions on both sides of the aisle, including “guarantees regarding abortion . . . offered to anti-
abortion Democrats” for the act to pass in the House and an executive order “signed by President 
Obama directly after the law’s enactment” which sought to reaffirm the PPACA’s application of the 
Hyde Amendment); see also supra note 15 (discussing the nature and substance of the Hyde 
Amendment). 
137. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing H.B. 214’s lack of exceptions). 
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organization is a nonprofit organization . . . .”138  These exemptions were 
later expanded, in part, to for-profit organizations that were rooted in 
religious values from their very inculcation.139 
These restrictions, which were in place well before the enactment of 
H.B. 214, adequately protect against the use of taxpayer funds for abortion 
services.  If these protections are still insufficient, the ruling in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby140 provides a less restrictive framework for the Texas 
Legislature to utilize in creating exemptions for individuals that resemble 
those laid out by the Court for the contraceptive mandate.141  Rather than 
having those opposed to abortion affirmatively opt out of coverage for such 
a procedure or meet exemption requirements, the Texas Legislature 
unilaterally placed the duty upon all of the women in Texas who are sexually 
active, or a potential victim of sexual assault or incest, to procure and pay 
for additional insurance to cover the possibility of abortion.142  If the 
factual basis for H.B. 214 is additional protection for taxpayers against the 
use of public funds for abortion, there are less restrictive methods already 
in place to serve that need, and thus the veracity of that claim does not hold 
up. 
Alternatively, if the drafters of H.B. 214 claim the underlying purpose is 
religious, the Hyde Amendments and the RFRA provide existing 
protections to serve this purpose.143  And if not, who is to say what other 
exemptions may need to be put in place to accommodate specific religious 
beliefs?  Would Christians be able to opt out of tax premiums used to 
subsidize the military and thus the killing of other human beings?  Would 
 
138. Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414–15 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
139. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (finding “[t]he 
contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA[,]” and allowing 
exemptions to extend to the for-profit corporation Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.). 
 140. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
141. See id. at 2775 (allowing exemptions to the PPACA’s contraceptive mandate for “closely 
held” religious organizations to extend to for-profit corporation’s such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.). 
142. See supra Section II.B (describing the regulatory regime of H.B. 214). 
143. See Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 850 (Vt. 1994) (“In response to Smith’s ‘virtual elimination’ 
of the mandate that government justify burdening religious practice through neutral laws, the United 
States Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, explicitly overruling Smith. . . .  
The Act provides that government ‘shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,’ unless the government demonstrates that 
burdening the person (1) furthers a compelling governmental interest, and (2) advances that interest in 
the least restrictive means possible.” (citation omitted) (quoting Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103–141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488–89 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1))); see also 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, § 3, 107 Stat. at 1488–89 (defining the appropriate level of judicial 
scrutiny for courts reviewing laws that burden a person’s free exercise of religion). 
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Christian Scientists be able to choose where to allocate their premiums so 
that they did not support vaccinations or blood transfusions?  Would 
Muslims be allowed to stop their insurance premiums from subsidizing 
medical research incorporating pork or other forbidden substances?  The 
simple answer is of course not.144  H.B. 214 fails to provide a purpose that 
can withstand factual scrutiny, and as such is unlikely to pass the threshold 
of veracity under the modified undue burden standard. 
IV.    CONCLUSION 
“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social 
life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives.”145  The Texas Legislature is simply not in the best 
position to understand the burdens reproductive issues present.146  The 
person in the best position to balance the difficult factors inherent in 
deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy is the woman deciding to 
terminate her pregnancy, and it is up to the courts to place her in the best 
position to make that decision. 
H.B. 214 places an undue burden on this right in the following ways.  
First, while the bill purports to be motivated by economic and religious 
freedom for taxpayers, the social and political climate of Texas coupled with 
myriads of abortion regulations proposed in this and recent legislative 
 
144. Justice Ginsburg posed a similar argument in her dissent for Burwell v. Hobby Lobby: “Would 
the exemption the Court holds RFRA demand for employers with religiously grounded objections to 
the use of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously grounded objections to blood 
transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, 
including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and 
Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others)?”  Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 
(J. Ginsburg, dissenting). 
145. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (citing ROSALIND 
POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE 109, 133, n.7 (rev. ed. 1190)); see also Erin 
Nelson, Autonomy, Equality, and Access to Sexual and Reproductive Health Care, 54 ALTA. L. REV. 707, 708 
(2017) (discussing the significance of reproductive health care in helping women have control and 
autonomy over their lives). 
146. Although Texas women make up half of the state’s population, women “only hold [20%] 
of the seats” in the Texas Legislature; and in addition to being predominately male, a majority of the 
legislature hold postgraduate degrees and are 45 years old or more. Alexa Ura & Jolie McCullough, 
Meet Your 84th Texas Legislature: White. Male. Middle-Aged. Christian., TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2015/01/14/demographics-2015-texas-legislature/ [https://perma. 
cc/7M3A-2L4Q]).  In contrast, “In 2014, the majority of abortion patients (60%) were in their 
[twenties], and the second-largest age-group was in their [thirties] (25%).”  Jerman, supra note 118.  
Therefore, not only are Texas legislators exponentially less likely to encounter the need for an abortion, 
they are even less likely to need financial assistance to obtain one. 
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sessions—some of which were adjudicated to be unconstitutional—
suggests that the bill’s true purpose is to restrict access to abortion based on 
Texas’s traditionally pro-life stance.  Second, the effect of the bill constitutes 
a significant economic and procedural burden for Texas women seeking an 
abortion, especially those in low income communities.  And third, the 
veracity of the bill’s underlying purpose, whether it be economic or religious 
freedom, does not satisfy the standard of scrutiny put forth by the Supreme 
Court.  There are many federal restrictions in place that already achieve the 
same end that H.B. 214 seeks to accomplish, and these existing laws could 
have been utilized to make accommodations that were least restrictive for 
all parties. 
However, most importantly, the bill demoralizes the women that think 
one day they may exercise their right to choose, even if it is only in the case 
of rape.  Most of the women targeted by H.B. 214 are in one of the most 
difficult positions of their lives.  Under H.B. 214, young women, married 
women, drug–addicted women, and victims of sexual assault alike are all at 
risk of being placed in a situation where, despite their and their doctor’s best 
wishes, the woman is not able to receive an abortion due to prohibitive cost 
or unavailability of doctors willing to perform.  Upon the failure of H.B. 2, 
or more specifically upon the Supreme Court’s holding that the bill was 
unconstitutional, the Texas Legislature appears to have deliberately 
attempted to regain the restrictions back in piecemeal.  Had all of the 
provisions regarding abortion passed in the 85th Legislature as intended, not 
only would women be unable to cover insurance under their health 
exchange plan, but existing state and federal bans on abortion funding 
would be broadened by “prohibiting Texas governmental entities from 
entering into any contractual relationships with clinics affiliated with 
abortion providers.”147 
This systematic degradation of the right to choose is exactly how a 
constitutional right becomes a veiled fiction.148  The least restrictive 
provisions are already in place to allow protections of those with genuinely 
held religious beliefs to freely practice their faith without undue 
encumbrance.  Further, H.B. 214’s restrictions merely serve to stigmatize an 
 
147. Poinsett, supra note 1, at 595. 
148. Cf. Hasstedt & Sonfield, supra note 21 (“[Texas] has spent years crippling a once-successful 
program supporting family planning and related services for low-income residents—all in service of an 
ideological agenda to shut out and shut down health centers that have any connection to abortion 
services.”). 
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already sensitive procedure that is often sought in the most difficult time of 
a woman’s life. 
The constitutional right found in Roe must stand as more than a mere 
illusion of freedom for those who cannot afford to pay out of pocket, or 
those who cannot jump all of the necessary hurdles the Texas Legislature 
puts in their way.  If this right is to stand, H.B. 214 cannot go on as enacted.  
The undue burden standard requires the purposes put forth by the 
Legislature to be grounded in more than gilded words unsupported by 
evidence; it requires that restrictions be made in the least burdensome 
manner, and that they be made first, with the mother in mind. 
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